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ABSTRACT 
 
Objective 
To evaluate differences in major outcomes between Bundled Payments for Care Improvement 
(BPCI) participating providers and non-participating providers for both Major Joint Replacement 
of the Lower Extremity (MJRLE) and Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) episodes. The 
outcome measures were Medicare payments, length of stay (LOS), and within episode 
readmission rates. 
 
Methods 
A difference-in-differences approach estimated the differential change in outcomes for Medicare 
beneficiaries who had an MJRLE or AMI at a BPCI participating hospital between the baseline 
(January 2011 through September 2013) and intervention (October 2013 through December 
2016) periods and beneficiaries with the same episode (MJRLE or AMI) at a matched 
comparison hospital. 
 
Main Outcomes and Measures 
Medicare payments, LOS, and readmissions during the episode, which includes the anchor (i.e., 
index) hospitalization and the 90-day post discharge period. 
 
Results  
Mean total Medicare payments for an MJRLE episode and the 90-day post discharge period 
declined $444 more (p < 0.0001) for Medicare beneficiaries with episodes initiated in a BPCI-
participating provider than for the beneficiaries in a comparison provider. This reduction was 
mainly due to reduced institutional post-acute care (PAC) payments. Slight reductions in carrier 
payments and LOS were estimated. Readmission rates were not found to be statistically different 
between the BPCI and the comparison populations. These findings suggest that PAC use can be 
reduced without adverse effects on recovery from MJRLE. The lack of statistically significant 
differences in effects for AMI could be explained by a smaller sample size or more heterogenous 
recovery paths in AMI. It may be challenging to treat AMI episodes using a standard of care 
approach, and with severe cases it might be difficult to standardize recovery paths. 
 
Conclusions  
Our findings suggest that, as currently designed, bundled payments can be effective in reducing 
payments for MJRLE episodes of care, but not necessarily for AMI. Most savings came from the 
declines in PAC use, which can be reduced without adverse effects on recovery from MJRLE. 
These findings are consistent with the results reported in the BPCI model evaluation for CMS.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For the past decade, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has been 
implementing new payment and service delivery models to improve patient care and lower costs 
to Medicare. Traditionally, Medicare makes separate Fee-for-Service (FFS) payments to 
providers for each of the individual services they provide to beneficiaries for a course of 
treatment. Because payment rewards the quantity of services furnished by providers, the FFS 
approach can result in minimal coordination among physicians and other healthcare settings. To 
align incentives for providers, CMS’s Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) has 
launched several types of Alternative Payment Models (APM), a payment approach that gives 
added incentive payments to provide high-quality and cost-efficient care. One of the APMs is the 
Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative, which launched in 2013 to apply a 
fixed price to individual episodes of care. This initiative incentivizes care coordination and 
efficiency by including services from multiple healthcare providers within the fixed target price. 
Among four BPCI models, BPCI Model 2 includes a Medicare beneficiary’s inpatient stay in the 
acute care hospital, post-acute care (PAC) and all related services during the episode of care (see 
the general description of the BPCI initiative in https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-
payments/). This model involved a retrospective bundled payment arrangement where actual 
expenditures were reconciled against an episode of care’s target price. In this model, Medicare 
continued to make FFS payments to providers who furnished services to beneficiaries in Model 2 
episodes. Participation was voluntary and up to 48 different clinical episodes were available in 
this model for participants to select. The total expenditures for a beneficiary’s episode was later 
reconciled against a bundled payment amount determined by CMS. CMS then issued a payment 
or a recoupment reflecting the aggregate performance compared to the target price. In Model 2, 
the episode of care included a Medicare beneficiary’s inpatient stay in the acute care hospital, 
PAC, and all related services during the episode of care⎯30, 60, or 90 days after hospital 
discharge. 
 
The goal of our study is to evaluate differences in major outcomes between BPCI Model 2 
participants and non-participants using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach based on the 
Medicare Part A and Part B claims data from the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2011 through Q4 2016. 
Our study focuses on two clinical episodes: Major Joint Replacement of the Lower Extremity 
(MJRLE) and Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI). An evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
BPCI initiative on major outcomes, such as Medicare payments, length of stay (LOS), and 
readmission rates, will provide healthcare decision makers with useful information on how the 
BPCI performed and how APMs can be refined to increase effectiveness. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Data  
 
This study includes healthcare provider participants in the BPCI Model 2 that covers services 
during an anchor (i.e., index) hospitalization and a 90-day post-discharge period for MJRLE or 
AMI episodes initiated from October 1, 2013 to December 31, 2016. Data from January 1 2011 – 
September 30 2013 represented the pre-BPCI period. Because the BPCI Model 2 includes 
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payments for the acute care and PAC period, the analysis comparing payments from different 
services by category, total payments, as well as length of stay and readmission rates may shed 
light on how the model incentivizes participants to respond to the bundled payments for their 
services provided to beneficiaries.   
 
For this comparison, we selected two clinical episodes, MJRLE and AMI. MJRLE (mainly hip 
and knee replacements) is the most common inpatient surgery for Medicare beneficiaries and can 
require lengthy recovery and rehabilitation periods. With more than 400,000 procedures in 2014, 
it cost more than $7 billion for the hospitalizations alone. Despite the high volume of these 
surgeries, quality and costs of care for these hip and knee replacement surgeries still vary greatly 
among providers.1 AMI, a common and serious condition among elderly, is the leading cause of 
morbidity and mortality globally. As an acute condition, it requires expedited diagnosis and 
intervention, often with a long recovery path. Because it incurs significantly high medical costs 
as well as productivity losses,2,3 it is important to encourage hospitals, physicians, and post-acute 
care providers to improve the coordination of care from the initial hospitalization through 
recovery. 
 
Data sources for this study are Medicare Part A and Part B enrollment and the claims available 
through the Virtual Research Data Center (VRDC) in the CMS’s Chronic Conditions Data 
Warehouse (CCW).i Data files are available by service type so that they can be linked to create 
longitudinal beneficiary histories. Data on demographic and enrollment characteristics are 
available for each Medicare beneficiary including diagnoses, utilized services, and payments at 
the level of each claim. Detailed data files we have utilized for this study by service type are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Data Files Used in Analysis by Service Type 
Service Type Years 
Medicare Claims (Fee-for-Service) 
Inpatient 2011-2016 
Outpatient 2011-2016 
Skilled Nursing 2011-2016 
Home Health 2011-2016 
Hospice 2011-2016 
Carrier 2011-2016 
Master Beneficiary Summary File Segments 
Base Beneficiary Summary File 2011-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
i In order to access and use Medicare data through the VRDC, data requests must be submitted to and approved by the CMS, 
which requires Data Use Agreement and IRB approval, as well as data usage fees. 
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Selecting Participant and Non-Participant Pairs 
 
The BPCI intervention included Medicare FFS beneficiaries with a qualifying Medicare Severity 
Diagnosis Related Group (MS-DRG) at a BPCI-participating provider from October 1, 2013, to 
December 31, 2016. Participating providers for BPCI Model 2 with a 90-day option were 
identified for both MJRLE and AMI episodes from the quarterly BPCI Analytic Files from 
CMSs BPCI Archived Materials.ii Complete lists of providers for both episode types were 
generated from the inpatient claims data that were used to determine anchor admission at acute 
care facilities for the DRGs associated with each of the episode types. 
 
To create a non-participating comparison group for matching with the BPCI participant group, 
we first defined the market for hospitals. Markets different from the BPCI participant markets 
were excluded from the comparison group as follows. From the CMS FY 2016 Final Rule and 
Correction Notice (CN) Impact Public Use File (PUF),iii the Geographic Labor Market Area was 
used to identify the core-based statistical area (CBSA) for each hospital, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for each CBSA was used as a measure of market competitiveness. A 
95% lognormal confidence interval for the average HHI of the BPCI participant markets was 
calculated. Non-participating providers in CBSAs with an HHI outside of the confidence interval 
and greater than the maximum HHI or less than the minimum HHI for a CBSA with a 
participating provider were not included in the analysis. 
 
To match each BPCI participating hospital with a comparison hospital for each episode type, we 
used a propensity score method. Data from the CMS 2016 Final Rule and CN Impact PUF was 
used to assign a region and urban/rural code (Urban, Rural, or Other Urban) to each provider. 
The propensity score model included variables obtained from the Impact PUF: bed size, average 
daily census, DSH percentage, case mix, and Medicare percentage. The annual number of 
episodes, calculated from the Inpatient Medicare Claims, was also included in the model. A 
model was fit for each episode type. A matching provider was selected for each BPCI participant 
based on the closest propensity score within the same region and urban/rural code.  
 
Identifying Episodes and Creating Bundles 
 
Following the specification steps of constructing a clinical episode for BPCI,4 we created clinical 
episodes of MJRLE and AMI. For all BPCI participants and the matched non-participants for 
each episode type, acute care hospital inpatient claims were grouped into episodes based on the 
beneficiary ID and the admission and discharge dates. Data files are available by service type as 
shown in Table 1, so that they can be linked to create longitudinal histories of care per 
beneficiary. All claims for a beneficiary between the admission and discharge dates are 
considered part of the anchor stay. Any stay for the same beneficiary with an admission date the 
 
ii https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Bundled-Payments/Archived-Materials.html 
iii “FY2016 FR and CN Impact PUF.xlsx” was used from FY16 Impact File at 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/FY2016-IPPS-Final-Rule-
Home-Page-Items/FY2016-IPPS-Final-Rule-Data-Files 
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same as the discharge date is considered a transfer. In this case, the second provider is the 
responsible provider although the initial admission date is considered the anchor admission date. 
 
PAC claims were linked to each anchor hospitalization via inpatient claims based on the 
beneficiary ID. Claims with a date of service within the 90-day episode window following the 
discharge date of the anchor hospitalization were considered part of the episode. Associated costs 
were calculated using the Inpatient, Outpatient, Emergency Department, Home Health, Skilled 
Nursing Facilities, Long Term Care Hospital, Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility, Hospice, and 
Carrier files. For the PAC measure, the payments from Home Health, Skilled Nursing Facilities, 
Long Term Care Hospital, and Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility were summed. 
 
Measures 
 
Several outcome measures were calculated for each episode of MJRLE and AMI to evaluate the 
effects of the BPCI Model 2. A qualifying MS-DRG at an acute care facility in the Inpatient file 
triggered an episode (e.g., 469 or 470 for MJRLE) with an initiating claim for an anchor 
hospitalization, and utilizations of services were captured as outcomes during the anchor 
hospitalization period and a 90-day post-acute period after the discharge date of the anchor 
hospitalization. Several individual Medicare-allowed payments by service type were calculated 
and the total payment was a summation of those individual payments. Length of stay (LOS) for 
the anchor hospitalization and readmission rate were calculated as well. These outcome measures 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Outcome Measures Calculated to Assess BPCI Effectiveness for a Clinical Episode 
(MJRLE or AMI) 
Source Payment LOS Rate 
Anchor Hospitalization X X  
Readmission X  X 
Outpatient visit/treatment X   
ER visit X   
Home Health Agency (HHA) X   
Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF) X   
Long-Term Care Hospital (LTCH) X   
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility (IRF) X   
Hospice X   
Carrier X   
Total Post-Acute Care (HHA, SNF, LTCH, IRF) X   
Total Episode (summation of all sources) X   
 
 
Difference-In-Differences Approach 
 
A difference-in-differences (DiD) approach was used to compare outcome measures for each of 
the two episode types, between participating and non-participating hospitals. DiD is a statistical 
technique to estimate a change in an outcome for an intervention group (in this case participation 
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in BPCI) between a baseline and intervention period relative to a change in the outcome for a 
control group (in this case the comparison group of non-participants). The DiD model uses 
outcomes both before and after the intervention (participation in BPCI) to control for time 
invariant differences between the two groups. This approach assumes parallel trends for the 
intervention and control groups over time. The DiD model was fit using a linear model of the 
form: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐴𝑗𝑡) + 𝜀𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡is the outcome metric for episode 𝑖 associated with provider 𝑗 in pair 𝑘 at time 𝑡; 𝛽0 is 
the intercept; 𝛽1 is the trend over time, 𝐼𝑃𝑖is an indicator of whether the episode was initiated by 
a BPCI participant; 𝐼𝐴𝑗𝑡is an indicator of whether the BPCI participant in the pair is an active 
participant at time  𝑡; 𝜀𝑘is the random effect for pair 𝑘; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡is the error term. In this model, 
𝛽4 is an estimator of the effect of participation in BPCI. 
 
To estimate our DiD models for MJRLE and AMI, time was measured quarterly. In our data 
ranging from Q1 2011 through Q4 2016, the baseline period started on Q1 2011 and the 
intervention period was from Q4 2013 through Q4 2016 when the BPCI participants started their 
interventions, although not all BPCI participants began their interventions on Q4 2013. Each pair 
of participants was marked active beginning in the quarter that the BPCI participant began the 
program.  
 
To determine the effect of participation in BPCI, 𝛽4, the coefficient of the interaction term 
between the indicator of whether the episode was initiated by a BPCI participant and the 
indicator of whether the BPCI participant in the pair is an active participant at time t was 
estimated. In each case, a p-value was calculated to determine if the effect was statistically 
significant. Statistical significance was assessed at the 0.05 level. Analyses were performed 
using SAS version 9.4. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Characteristics of Participant and Non-Participant Matched Pairs  
 
Tables 3 and 4 show characteristics of the BPCI participants and non-participants before and 
after propensity score matching. 
 
A total of 3,075 acute-care providers were identified who treated MJRLE patients between 2011 
and 2016. Two hundred ninety of these providers were 90-day, Model 2 BPCI participants. One 
BPCI participant was eliminated because there were no pre-BPCI episodes. From the 2,785 non-
participating providers, 445 were excluded for an insufficient number of episodes, and 462 were 
eliminated because the market conditions were different than those for the participating 
providers, as described earlier. The remaining 1,878 non-participating providers were considered 
for propensity score matching.  
 
7 
 
A total of 3,154 acute-care providers were identified who treated AMI patients between 2011 
and 2016. Ninety-four of these providers were 90-day, model 2 BPCI participants. From the 
3,060 non-participating providers, 780 were excluded for an insufficient number of episodes, and 
651 were eliminated because the market conditions were different than those for the participating 
providers, as descripted in the earlier section. The remaining 1,629 non-participating providers 
were considered for propensity score matching. 
 
After the matching based on the estimated propensity scores, the matching pairs for each of the 
two episodes had no or very little differences in characteristics between BPCI participants and 
non-participants, indicating they are comparable in pairs. 
 
 
Summary Data of Participants and Non-Participants for Pre- and Post-BPCI Period  
 
A total of 285 BPCI participant and non-participant provider pairs were merged with MJRLE 
episodes. Four pairs were removed from the data set because two participant providers did not 
have any claims data since their BPCI start dates, and another two participant providers were the 
only two who did not begin participation until the last two quarters of the intervention period. 
The remaining 285 BPCI participant providers had 269,112 MJRLE episodes during the baseline 
period and 130,376 episodes during the intervention period, compared with 280,355 episodes in 
the baseline period and 128,033 episodes in the intervention period for the matched comparison 
non-participating providers (Table 5).  
 
Similarly, a total of 94 pairs BPCI participant and non-participant provider pairs were merged 
with AMI episodes, resulting in 28,403 AMI episodes during the baseline period and 10,951 
episodes during the intervention period for the BPCI participant providers, compared with 
27,721 episodes in the baseline period and 10,623 episodes in the intervention period for the 
matched comparison non-participant providers (Table 6).   
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Table 3. Characteristics of BPCI Participants and Non-Participants for MJRLE Episodes 
Characteristics 
BPCI 
Participants 
All Non-
Participants 
Matched 
Non-
Participants 
Difference 
Between 
BPCI and 
All Non-
Participants 
Difference 
Between 
BPCI and 
Matched 
Non-
Participants 
(N = 289) (N = 1,878) (N = 289) 
Region 
1 9% 5% 9% 4% 0% 
2 16% 11% 16% 5% 0% 
3 25% 18% 25% 7% 0% 
4 11% 19% 11% 7% 0% 
5 6% 5% 6% 1% 0% 
6 5% 9% 5% 4% 0% 
7 8% 15% 8% 7% 0% 
8 9% 6% 9% 3% 0% 
9 11% 12% 11% 2% 0% 
Urban/ 
Rural 
Large Urban 59% 46% 59% 12% 0% 
Other Urban 36% 40% 36% 4% 0% 
Rural 6% 14% 6% 8% 0% 
Other 
Measures 
Bedsize 299 235 304 64 5 
Ave. Daily Census 192 139 197 53 5 
Ave. Annual Episodes 244 190 251 54 7 
DSH Percent* 0.272 0.274 0.268 0.002 0.004 
Case Mix 1.687 1.645 1.68 0.042 0.007 
Medicare Percent 0.382 0.376 0.384 0.006 0.002 
Note: * DSH percent: Disproportionate Share Hospital 
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Table 4. Characteristics of BPCI Participants and Non-Participants for AMI Episodes 
Characteristics 
BPCI 
Participants 
All Non-
Participants 
Matched 
Non-
Participants 
Difference 
Between 
BPCI and 
All Non-
Participants 
Difference 
Between 
BPCI and 
Matched 
Non-
Participants 
(N=94) (N=1629) (N=94) 
Region 
1 9% 6% 9% 3% 0% 
2 24% 13% 24% 11% 0% 
3 19% 21% 19% 2% 0% 
4 13% 17% 13% 5% 0% 
5 7% 5% 7% 2% 0% 
6 4% 7% 4% 3% 0% 
7 5% 13% 5% 7% 0% 
8 3% 5% 3% 2% 0% 
9 15% 12% 15% 3% 0% 
Urban/ 
Rural 
Large Urban 57% 50% 57% 7% 0% 
Other Urban 35% 39% 35% 4% 0% 
Rural 7% 10% 7% 3% 0% 
Other 
Measures 
Bedsize 305 281 319 24 14 
Ave. Daily Census 194 173 202 21 8 
Ave. Annual Episodes 74 63 72 11 2 
DSH Percent* 0.302 0.290 0.303 0.012 0.001 
Case Mix 1.635 1.651 1.621 0.016 0.014 
Medicare Percent 0.381 0.386 0.376 0.005 0.005 
Note: * DSH percent: Disproportionate Share Hospital 
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Table 5. Number of Episodes by BPCI Providers' Baseline and Intervention Period and 
Participant-Nonparticipant Status for MJRLE 
BPCI Participant Status  
Period 
Total  
Baseline 
(Inactive) 
Intervention 
(Active) 
Non-participant 280,355 (51.0%) 128,033 (49.5%) 408,388 (50.6%) 
Participant 269,112 (49.0%) 130,376 (50.5%) 399,488 (49.4%) 
Total 
549,467 
(100.0%) 258,409 (100.0%) 
807,876 
(100.0%) 
 
 
Table 6. Number of Episodes by BPCI Providers' Baseline and Intervention Period and 
Participant-Nonparticipant Status for AMI 
BPCI Participant Status  
Period 
Total  
Baseline 
(Inactive) 
Intervention 
(Active) 
Non-participant 27,721 (49.4%) 10,623 (49.2%) 38,344 (40.4%) 
Participant 28,403 (50.6%) 10,951 (50.8%) 39,354 (50.7%) 
Total 56,124 (100.0%) 21,574 (100.0%) 77,698 (100.0%) 
 
 
Difference-in-Differences Results 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 present mean values of Medicare payments, readmission rate, and LOS, as 
well as the estimated differences for MJRLE and AMI, respectively, among matched BPCI-
participating and comparison providers in active and inactive BPCI periods.  
 
For the MJRLE BPCI episodes, the mean total payment during the baseline period was $25,717 
and declined to $24,184 in the intervention period. For the comparison episodes, the mean total 
payment during the baseline period was $24,913 and declined to $23,745 in the intervention 
period. Payments declined by an estimated $444 more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than 
for the comparison population between the baseline and intervention periods. This payment 
reduction for the BPCI population can be attributed mostly to institutional PAC which declined 
by an estimated $674 more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than for the comparison 
population between the baseline and intervention periods. More specifically, the IRF payments 
declined by an estimated $365 more (p < 0.0001) and the SNF payments declined by an 
estimated $280 more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than for the comparison population. 
The mean Carrier payments also declined by an estimated $38 more (p = 0.0040) for the BPCI 
population than for the comparison population. It is notable that the mean anchor payment 
increased by an estimated $239 more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than for the 
comparison population between the baseline and intervention periods.  
 
A slight reduction in LOS for the MJRLE episodes was also statistically significant. For the 
BPCI participating providers, the mean LOS was 3.32 days in the baseline period and declined to 
2.81 days in the intervention period. For the comparison episodes, however, the mean LOS was 
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3.30 days in the baseline and declined to 2.85 days in the intervention period. LOS declined by 
an estimated 0.05 days more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than for the comparison 
population between the baseline and intervention periods. Although this effect is statistically 
significant, a reduction in LOS of 0.05 days is not substantial. 
 
There were no significant changes in the readmission payments or readmission rates. No 
significant changes were estimated for ER payments, either. Payments for outpatient visits 
increased by an estimated $29 more (p < 0.0001) for the BPCI population than for the 
comparison population between the baseline and intervention periods. 
 
For the AMI episodes, there were no statistically significant changes except for the mean IRF 
payments. The IRF payments declined by an estimate of $109 more (p = 0.0450) for the BPCI 
population than for the comparison population between the baseline and intervention periods.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Our findings suggest that bundled payments may reduce payments for a MJRLE episode of care. 
Most savings came from the decline in the PAC payments, which can be reduced without 
adverse effects on recovery from MJRLE. There appeared to have been no apparent changes in 
readmission rates and ER payments. The overall reduction in payments was substantial despite 
an increase in payment for the anchor hospitalization, which may potentially indicate that the 
investment during the anchor hospitalization stay could help decrease the need for some PAC. 
This hypothesis should be examined in further analyses.  
 
These findings are consistent with other research indicating that bundled payments for MJRLE 
can reduce payments for an episode of care. Previous experiments with bundled payments for 
lower extremity joint replacement have found reduced average payments per case through 
shorter hospital stays and less PAC.5,6,7,8,9 Our finding of lower payments through reducing 
institutional PAC is consistent with other research that suggests PAC use can be reduced or 
changed without adverse effects on recovery. 
 
The lack of statistically significant differences in effects for AMI could be explained by more 
heterogenous paths in AMI recovery. Other studies have also found that bundled payments for 
AMI did not lead to reduction in payments.10,11 It may be difficult to treat AMI episodes using a 
standard approach; severe cases might be challenging to control recovery paths. There were also 
far fewer episodes of AMI, so there is less statistical power. 
 
Our study has the following limitations: First, we were limited to the number of BPCI 
participants for each episode type, and so in some cases there may not have been enough 
statistical power to demonstrate a statistically significant effect. Second, the payment data used 
in this analysis were not standardized to remove the effects of Medicare’s geographic wage and 
other payment adjustment factors, and were not adjusted for inflation. Third, our DiD model 
results were not adjusted for covariates including beneficiaries’ demographic and clinical risk  
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Table 7.  Medicare Payments, Readmission Rate, and Length of Stay for MJRLE  
among Matched BPCI-Participating and Comparison Providers in Active and Inactive Periods 
 
BPCI 
Participating 
Providers 
BPCI 
Participating 
Providers 
Comparison 
(non-
participating) 
Providers 
Comparison 
(non-
participating) 
Providers 
Difference-
in-
Differences 
Estimate 
p-value 
 Inactive Active Inactive Active   
Number of episodes 269,112 130,376 280,355 128,033   
Total Medicare payments during anchor 
hospitalization & 90-d post discharge 
period, $ 25,717 24,184 24,913 23,745 -443.97 <.0001 
Total Medicare Part A payments 
      
Anchor hospitalization, $ 12,838 12,997 12,702 12,597 $239 <.0001 
Inpatient readmissions, 90-d post 
discharge period, $ 163 1,580 1,626 1,560 -$1 0.973 
Total Medicare 90-d post discharge period 
payments, $ 
      
Outpatient payments 577 620 599 620 $29 <.0001 
Emergency department payments 80 95 83 97 $2 0.198 
Home Health Agency 2,172 2,188 2,044 2,074 -$10 0.256 
Skilled Nursing Facility 4,762 3,675 4,629 3,831 -$280 <.0001 
Long Term Care Hospital 115 67 104 75 -$18 0.088 
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility 1,704 1,176 1,342 1,149 -$365 <.0001 
Hospice 64 58 69 65 -$3 0.377 
Carrier 1,770 1,728 1,718 1,678 -$38 0.004 
Total Medicare post-acute care 
(HHA+SNF+LTCH+IRF), 90-d post 
discharge period payments, $ 8,754 7,107 8,117 7,130 -$674 <.0001 
Readmission rate by post discharge period 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 -0.017 0.265 
Total inpatient LOS during anchor 
hospitalization, d 3.32 2.81 3.30 2.85 -0.05 <.0001 
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Table 8.  Medicare Payments, Readmission Rate, and Length of Stay for AMI 
among Matched BPCI-Participating and Comparison Providers in Active and Inactive Periods 
 
BPCI 
Participating 
Providers 
BPCI 
Participating 
Providers 
Comparison 
(non-
participating) 
Providers 
Comparison 
(non-
participating) 
Providers 
Difference-
in-
Differences 
Estimate 
p-value 
 Inactive Active Inactive Active   
Number of episodes 28,403 10,951 27,721 10,623   
Total Medicare payments during anchor 
hospitalization & 90-d post discharge 
period, $ 
26,179 27,063 26,090 26,527 $389 0.358 
Total Medicare Part A payments       
Anchor hospitalization, $ 9,450 9,476 9,645 9,476 $159 0.146 
Inpatient readmissions, 90-d post 
discharge period, $ 
6,744 7,302 6,644 6,857 $377 0.152 
Total Medicare 90-d post discharge period 
payments, $ 
      
Outpatient payments 1,260 1,525 1,296 1,568 -$3 0.958 
Emergency department payments 186 257 188 257 $3 0.755 
Home Health Agency 1,063 1,090 1,013 974 $58 0.058 
Skilled Nursing Facility 3,526 3,506 3,404 3,302 $6 0.960 
Long Term Care Hospital 367 227 459 391 -$32 0.665 
Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility 485 475 480 566 -$109 0.045 
Hospice 129 183 128 230 -$48 0.092 
Carrier 2,970 3,022 2,833 2,906 -$37 0.505 
Total Medicare post-acute care 
(HHA+SNF+LTCH+IRF), 90-d post 
discharge period payments, $ 
5,441 5,298 5,356 5,234 -$78 0.635 
Readmission rate by post discharge period 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.009 0.788 
Total inpatient LOS during anchor 
hospitalization, d 
5.08 4.61 4.89 4.45 -0.045 0.509 
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factors before hospitalization. Fourth, the current analyses used all the outcome variables from 
the beneficiary-episodes, ignoring potential differences between those who utilized services and 
those who did not (e.g., those who utilized SNF services vs. those who did not). The issue of 
including many zero values in the dependent variable needs to be addressed by using either two-
stage regression models or censored regression models. 
 
Despite these limitations, our findings provide information useful to healthcare policy makers 
and the research community, suggesting that bundled payments for MJRLE can reduce payments 
for an episode of care. That was not the case for AMI. More specifically, PAC use can be 
reduced without adverse effects on recovery from the MJRLE.  
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